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Emotions, Cognitions and Moderation: 




Why do some voters accept their defeat and agree to a democratic verdict while some do 
not? This distinction between “graceful” and “sore” losers is essential for the stability of 
democratic regimes. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of losers’ consent in the 
2016 Brexit referendum using original public opinion data. Extant studies suggest that 
post-electoral reactions are mainly outcome-driven, consider winners and losers as 
homogeneous groups, and neglect the individual-level profile and motivations of graceful 
losers. Using an innovative and direct question to measure losers’ consent, this research 
finds that voters’ reaction to the outcome is also process-driven. Graceful losers are 
politically involved and principled citizens who are more inclined to judge the merits of 
democracy in procedural terms. They are also more politically sophisticated, less 
emotionally engaged in the electoral decision, hold more moderate views on the object of 
the vote, and are torn between the options until the end of the campaign. These findings 
have important implications for democratic theory. The stability of democracies depends 
not only on sophisticated voters capable of prioritizing the benefits of the democratic 
process over disappointing outcomes but also on voters who are indecisive, hesitant, and 






In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, more than 4.1 million citizens of the United Kingdom 
(UK) signed a petition calling for a second referendum on European Union (EU) 
membership, this time based on new rules in terms of the majority (60%) and the turnout 
(75%) required to act on the result. Their hopes faded away when the UK government 
responded that the decision made by voters in the referendum held on 23 June 2016 
“must be respected” (Harley 2016). This episode tells a lot about losers’ reactions after 
defeat. On the one hand, millions of citizens, most likely Remain supporters, refused to 
concede victory. On the other hand, the UK government ignored this request and made 
clear, especially to the Tory party base, that “Brexit was going to happen” and that those 
“who didn’t like the result [of the referendum] had to respect it” (Shipman 2017: 3). 
Interest in the reaction of losers after elections is easily explained. As Nadeau and Blais 
(1993: 553) noted, the continued existence of democratic systems depends on “losers’ 
consent”. “Winners” will generally be satisfied with the system which has just produced a 
result that is favourable to them. Much less obvious is the reaction of the “losers”, since 
their support “requires the recognition of the legitimacy of a procedure that has produced 
an outcome deemed to be undesirable. In the end, the viability of electoral democracy 
depends on its ability to secure the support of a substantial proportion of individuals who 
are displeased with the outcome of an election.” 
This paper analyzes the reaction of the losers in the aftermath of the referendum on the 
UK’s membership in the EU, also known as the “Brexit” referendum. It contributes to the 
current literature in several ways. Using opinion survey data collected right after the 
referendum, it first shows the importance of distinguishing between “graceful” and “sore” 
losers for a better understanding of the crucial phenomenon of losers’ consent. Second, it 
does so by looking at both the usual measure of satisfaction with democracy and a more 
direct measure of voters’ acceptance of the referendum’s outcome. Third, it examines and 
compares the distinct attitudinal profiles of these two groups of losers. This analysis 
shows that the consent of graceful losers depends on a balance between emotions, the 
moderation of their opinions, and political sophistication. 
The role of graceful losers, important in general, is even more crucial in contexts where 
defeat is harder to accept, namely in emerging democracies (Anderson and Mendes 2006; 
Moehler 2009; Rich 2015) or after intensely fought and polarized elections or 
consultations where citizens faced decisions with important consequences (Nadeau and 
Blais 1993; Johnston et al. 1996; Atikcan 2015a; Bowler 2016). The Brexit referendum 
would fall in this category with its highly contentious consequences. That said, the issue 
of the consent of losers is a universal phenomenon in electoral democracies and is always 
an important concern regardless of the specific context (Anderson et al. 2005; Curini et 
al. 2011; Esaiasson 2011). Yet, we do not know much about the individual-level profile 
and motivations of graceful losers, and what distinguishes them from sore ones. This 
paper uses rare survey data that clearly distinguishes between graceful and sore losers. It 
thus offers useful insights for better understanding losers’ consent in the Brexit case and 




Losers’ Consent: What Do We Know Well and Less Well? 
Work on losers’ consent has led to important advances. First, these studies highlighted 
that this phenomenon expresses diffuse support for the electoral process and not for the 
winner of a particular election (Dahl 1989; Przeworski 1991; Esaiasson 2011). As 
Coleman (1988: 197) puts it, “Consenting to a process is not the same thing as consenting 
to the outcome of the process.” 
This body of work also showed in which contexts losers’ consent would be easier to 
obtain (Anderson and Guillori 1997; Banducci and Karp 2003; Anderson et al. 2005; 
Curini et al. 2011; Howell and Justwan 2013; Rich and Treece 2018) or where the 
absence of certain conditions could lead to the challenge of the electoral practices in 
place (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson and Mendes 2006; Moehler 2009). This 
means that defeat and victory do not always have the same meaning and do not have the 
same effect on individuals’ attitudes towards democratic institutions. These outcomes are 
experienced with varying degrees of intensity, most notably: (a) in proportional regimes 
as opposed to presidential or majority regimes with a “winner-takes-all” approach 
(Anderson and Guillori 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002 ; Anderson et al. 2005),  (b) 
in emerging democracies where the aftermath is sometimes uncertain as opposed to well-
established ones where today’s losers can be reasonably confident to be tomorrow’s 
winners (Przeworski 1991; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson et al. 2005; 
Anderson and Mendes 2006; Moehler 2009; Rich 2015; Rich and Treece 2018), (c) when 
the winner is narrowly decided versus having a decisive winner (Howell and Justwan 
2013), and (d) if the victory or defeat is compensated for or amplified by a similar or 
different experience at the national or local/regional level (Loewen and Blais 2006; Blais 
and Gélineau 2007; Singh et al. 2012). 
These studies also examined the motivations of winners and losers. A first approach 
explains the reaction of winners and losers in utilitarian terms. According to this logic, 
“winners are happier because the parties that represent their views and interests are now 
in government and their preferences are likely to be enacted” (Singh et al. 2012: 202). 
From this perspective, the intensity of an individual’s post-election reaction is related to 
their ideological distance from the winner (Anderson et al. 2005; Brunell and Buchler 
2009; Kim 2009; Curini et al. 2011, Esaiasson 2011; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Singh 
et al. 2012). 
A second approach is inspired by work that is “grounded in people’s well-documented 
motivation to maintain consistency in their beliefs and attitudes” (Anderson et al. 2005: 
26-27; Festinger 1957; McGuire 1968; Funder and Colvin 1991; Granberg 1993; Beggan 
and Allison 1993). The losers, in a state of “post-election dissonance” (Frenkel and Doob 
1976; Cigler and Getter 1977; Regan and Kilduff 1988; Joslyn 1998), re-establish this 
balance by devaluing the process that led to the rejection of their favorite candidate, 
while the winners find even more virtues in the process (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; 
Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 2006). 
A third approach is based on the emotions generated by the experiences of victory and 
defeat. The experience of victory generates positive feelings (Atkinson 1957; McClelland 
1987; Thaler 1994) whereas defeat produces negative emotions such as anger and 
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frustration (Anderson et al. 2005: 23-26; Esaiasson 2011; Singh et al. 2012). Therefore, a 
victory produces psychological benefits unrelated to policy considerations, which induce 
winners to show increased support for democratic institutions, while defeat incites the 
opposite reaction among the losers. 
This review of the literature highlights the progress made in the study of winners’ and 
losers’ reactions, but there are also some limitations to this body of research. The first is 
the tendency to consider winners and losers as homogeneous groups. This can be justified 
by arguing that the shared experience of defeat or victory is at the very core of this 
classification. However, this conceals the key phenomenon behind losers’ consent. The 
fact that some studies have distinguished between different groups of winners and losers 
is a step in the right direction. As Singh et al. (2012: 202-203) state, “recent work in 
comparative politics has begun to differentiate between types of winners ... 
disaggregating winners and accounting for the specific vote they cast”. Nonetheless, the 
main issue remains to distinguish between two groups of losers, those who recognize the 
legitimacy of an electoral decision and those who challenge it, and to examine the profile 
and motivations of each group. Even the literature looking at repeated EU referendums 
has only partially and indirectly brought up the question of losers’ consent (e.g., Hobolt 
2006; Rose and Borz 2013; Atikcan 2015a; Atikcan 2015b). In short, we must return to 
the spirit of the question raised by Anderson and Mendes (2006: 92): “why are some 
losers more discontented than others to the point of contesting the legitimacy of an 
electoral outcome?” 
Another limitation with existing work, which relates to the first, is highlighted by Craig et 
al. (2006: 579) when they write that “progress still needs to be made in identifying the 
individual-level processes that account for graceful or voluntarily accepted losing”. 
While important work has been done on this issue (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and 
Mendes 2006; Moehler 2009; Curini et al. 2011), the focus remains on the study of 
contextual factors that may affect the magnitude of the winner-loser gap (see, for 
example, Esaiasson 2011; Singh et al. 2012; Howell and Justwan 2013; Rich 2015; Rich 
and Treece 2018). The systematic study of the individual-level correlates of losers’ 
consent remains more limited. The effect of certain determinants, such as emotions, on 
how losers rally has been very rarely studied, although it is often cited as a factor that 
may facilitate or hinder consent (Anderson et al. 2005: 25-26; Esaiasson 2011: 102-103; 
Singh et al. 2012). In short, the effect of individual-level factors leading to losers’ 
consent remains under-studied. 
A third limitation of the existing work is the variable used to study the rallying of losers. 
As we have just argued, the central phenomenon that needs to be assessed is the rallying 
of “graceful” losers, which is crucial to ensuring the stability of democratic institutions. 
Yet, as Rich (2015: 245) points out: “there remains little consensus on how just to 
measure losers’ consent other than the expectation of a divergence of opinion on 
democratic institutions between winners and losers” (see also Rich and Treece 2018: 
418). Measures such as satisfaction with democracy or confidence in institutions are 
useful because they are commonplace and they thus enable comparative studies to be 
carried out (see, in particular, Anderson et al. 2005). But they remain indirect measures of 
voters’ rallying to an actual electoral outcome. More direct measures of this rallying 
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ought to be used if one is to shed light on this crucial phenomenon in a democratic 
system. 
 
Who Are the “Graceful” Losers and Why Do They Gracefully Accept their Defeat? 
This study aims at filling an important gap in the literature by providing a deeper 
understanding of the winner-loser gap with the use of a direct measure of losers’ consent, 
and with a specific attention given to the individual characteristics and motivations of the 
“graceful losers”. In determining the key characteristics that distinguish graceful losers 
from sore ones, our main interest lies in the impact of attitudinal and behavioral variables 
on losers’ consent. Our expectations are that graceful losers are less emotionally engaged 
in the electoral decision made, are more politically sophisticated, and hold more moderate 
(or less intense) views about the object of the decision. These hypotheses are derived 
from some of the conclusions from the literature on the winner-loser gap, and from the 
broader literature on the political psychology of voter behavior. 
Many studies have highlighted the impact of emotions on political behaviour (Marcus and 
MacKuen 1993; Nadeau et al. 1995; Marcus et al. 2000; Neuman et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, emotions caused by defeat are often presented as an important factor 
explaining voters’ reactions after an election (Anderson et al. 2005: 25-26; Esaiasson 
2011: 101; Singh et al. 2012: 202). Still, the link between emotions and losers’ consent 
has not been clearly established to date. Following Anderson and colleagues (2005: 25), 
we agree that “losing leads to anger” and we expect that graceful losers’ emotional 
reaction to their defeat will be less intense than it is the case for sore losers. 
Previous work has also shown that losers’ consent rests on individuals’ ability to make a 
distinction between the electoral process and the specific outcomes it produced (Coleman 
1988; Dahl 1989; Przeworski 1991; Esaiasson 2011). Empirical work has shown that 
more sophisticated citizens are more apt to handle the kind of distinction between 
abstract concepts (or general principles) like procedural fairness and concrete electoral 
outcomes (Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). The firmness and accessibility of sophisticated losers’ views about 
democratic principles should facilitate their rallying after a defeat and contribute to 
maintaining their faith in democratic principles. We thus expect that more politically 
cognizant losers will be better able to master the principles that drive the democratic 
process and hence more likely to accept defeat. 
Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that graceful losers hold more moderate views (or 
less intense preferences vis-à-vis the object of the vote decision) than sore losers 
(Anderson et al. 2005; Brunell and Buchler 2009; Kim 2009; Curini et al. 2011, 
Esaiasson 2011; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Singh et al. 2012). Less intense or less 
passionate preferences should make consent easier and lead to higher levels of political 
support since post-electoral dissonance is less pronounced among voters experiencing a 
lower loss of utility. Consequently, voters with moderate views or sharing some of the 
opinions of their opponents will more easily recognize their defeat, as they will suffer a 
smaller loss of utility and find it easier to hold cognitive consonance; such voters could 
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be viewed as being less “cross-pressured” than others (Zaller 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 
2002). Another useful indicator of voters’ moderation and ambivalence is likely to be the 
moment when they made their voting decision. A late voting decision is often related to 
an inability to decide between options that seem equally acceptable and thus remain in 
the balance until the very end of the campaign (Lavine 2001; Willocq 2019), something 
that is likely to make post-election rallying easier. It can also reflect lesser interest vis-à-
vis the electoral campaign and the issues being debated (Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous 
1994). These two possible states of mind – ambivalence or indifference – can each 
explain why “late deciders” may be more inclined to accept defeat. 
 
Data and Measurements 
Most of the studies focusing on winners’ and losers’ reactions examine the attitudes of 
both groups towards the democratic process and institutions following an election 
(Anderson et al. 2005). A second approach, much less used, is to ask respondents directly 
about the legitimacy of the victory of the winning camp and then to examine the profile 
of “graceful losers”.1 For the reasons mentioned above, we adopt this second approach by 
proposing a detailed analysis of a specific case, namely the Brexit referendum. 
We rely for this purpose on an online survey conducted by Survation between July 1 to 5 
2016 under the scientific supervision of the authors. This survey used a representative 
quota-based sampling approach using Survation’s online panel. The questionnaire, which 
includes about 100 items mostly related to the Brexit campaign, was put to 1514 UK 
individuals who were targeted according to their age, sex and region of residence (the 
weighting targets used are based on mid-year estimates for 2015 of the 2011 census). 
More details concerning the survey, the coding, and the wording of the questions are 
presented in the online appendix. 
The survey question we use to measure respondents’ perception of the legitimacy of the 
electoral outcome is the following: “Do you think that the government should accept the 
result of the referendum and that the UK should leave the European Union or do you 
think that the government should not accept the result of the referendum and that a 
second referendum should be held on this question?” The Brexit referendum was not 
legally binding. While it is very likely that most voters were unaware of this 
constitutional nuance2, some of our survey respondents may nonetheless have been aware 
                                                             
1 Nadeau and Blais (1993) measured the legitimacy of the victory of the winning party in the 1988 
Canadian federal election using the question: “As a result of this election, did the Canadian people give the 
Conservative government the right to implement the Free Trade Agreement?” Not surprisingly, the 
overwhelming majority of the winners (93%) responded in the affirmative, whereas only 58% of the losers 
did. 
2 The question of the non-binding character of the referendum was virtually absent in the campaign 
according to the extensive media content analysis published by the Centre for Research in Communication 
and Culture at Loughborough University (Jackson et al. 2016). Beyond media coverage, one may find 
several references to political arguments on how the referendum was perceived as politically binding even 
though it was not legally binding. For example: 
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of it and therefore answered this question on the basis of the fact that the UK government 
was under no obligation to leave the EU following the referendum, which would make 
them wrongly categorized in our analysis as sore losers. Although we recognize that this 
represents a potential limitation to the validity of our dependent variable and that the 
reader ought to keep this in mind while assessing our results, we believe that it is unlikely 
to have affected a significant number of losers in their decision to accept the outcome or 
not. 
We make use of five variables to measure the various attitudes that we expect to be 
central in defining the distinct profile of graceful losers. Respondents’ emotional reaction 
to the outcome of the referendum is measured on a five-point scale where the minimum 
value means being very angry about the result and the maximum score means being very 
happy with the victory of the Leave option. To verify if graceful losers are more 
sophisticated than sore losers, we use a factual knowledge scale (see Zaller 1992; Price 
and Zaller 1993; Nadeau et al. 2008) made up of four items about the European Union.3 
Individuals’ attitudes toward the EU are tapped using their relative level of attachment to 
the UK and the EU, as well as their opinion on whether too many issues are decided on 
by the European Union. Finally, we consider the moment of decision to be “late” if the 
vote decision was taken in the final week of the referendum campaign (coded .67) or on 
polling day (coded 1). These last three variables are aimed at capturing some aspects of 
graceful losers’ opinion moderation. 
We also make use of the more traditional indicator of “satisfaction with democracy” as a 
dependent variable to further illustrate the usefulness of distinguishing between two 
groups of losers. Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a five-point scale where 1 
means being very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the UK and 5 being very 
satisfied (rescaled 0-1). 
 
Findings 
We begin the empirical analysis by examining the results obtained when we measure 
losers’ consent directly, via our question that asked about whether the UK government 
should accept the result of the Brexit referendum. Unsurprisingly, no less than 93% of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
— “The prime minister has said he would have to trigger it [Article 50] immediately after a vote, although 
this might have been a way of emphasising that there would be no going back, to people thinking of voting 
leave.” (Siddique 2016). 
— During one of the debates on the referendum bill on 9 June 2015, the then Foreign Secretary said, 
“decision about our membership should be taken by the British people, not by Whitehall bureaucrats, 
certainly not by Brussels Eurocrats; not even by Government Ministers or parliamentarians in this 
Chamber” (Hansard 2015). 
— The government leaflet sent to all households advocating a Remain vote told voters that it would 
implement the result. 
3 The battery is formed of the following four statements to which respondents were asked to answer true or 
false: 1) Switzerland is a member of the EU (false); 2) Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
representatives to the European Parliament (false); 3) The Netherlands hold at the moment the presidency 
of the Council of the European Union (true); 4) The European Union has 15 Member States (false). 
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“Leave” supporters responded that the government should accept that verdict (Table 1). 
The most important result given our theoretical concern lies in the reaction of the losers 
(the “Remain” supporters). The figures indicate that 37% of losers believed, in the days 
that followed the Brexit referendum, that the government had to accept the result and that 
the UK therefore had to leave the European Union (Table 1). This means that almost 2 
out of 3 losers refused to endorse the result either because they objected to it (53%) or 
were undecided (10%) about it.4 
[Table 1 about here] 
The rallying of losers in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum was crucial. Leave’s 
support was only slightly higher (51.9%) than the required (or procedural) majority (50% 
+ 1) to win. However, a second, much larger, majority emerges in the survey data being 
examined here. This democratic majority – in favor of accepting the result – reaches 65% 
(Table 1) and far exceeds the procedural majority. This massive majority is comprised of 
a coalition of winners (who make up 73% of this democratic majority) and of a 
significant number of losers, who make up more than a quarter (27%) of this democratic 
majority. It is clear that the stability of the UK’s democratic regime is based much more 
on the expression of this majority and not just on the support expressed by the winners of 
the Brexit referendum, who are only slightly more numerous than its losers. 
The preceding figures emphasize that there are not just two key groups after an election 
(i.e. “winners” and “losers”), but rather three: “winners”, overwhelmingly satisfied with 
the result; “sore losers”, who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the outcome; and 
“graceful losers”, who comply with the procedural rules.5 The existence of these three 
groups nuances the consensual interpretation about the emergence of a post-electoral 
winner-loser gap according to which: “Across a large number of established, newly 
established and non-established democracies, citizens who voted for a party out of power 
report lower levels of system support than those who elect for a party in power” 
(Esaiasson 2011: 102). 
The data in Tables 2 and 3, which look at satisfaction with democracy as a dependent 
variable, further show the importance of distinguishing between these three groups. 
Grouping respondents into homogeneous blocks in Table 2 leads to the usual conclusion 
that satisfaction with democracy is higher among winners (52%) than among losers 
(45%).6 The results of Table 3 change this interpretation by showing that the level of 
satisfaction with democracy among graceful losers (57%) is not smaller, but in fact 
                                                             
4 The 37% rallying figure in the case of the Brexit referendum is lower than that of the 1988 “free trade 
election” in Canada (Nadeau and Blais 1993). This is not surprising given the different scope of the two 
plebiscites. The 1988 Canadian election was about joining an economic free trade agreement while the 
2016 UK referendum was about withdrawing from a much larger economic and political partnership. 
5 It may be possible to think of abstainers as having been the real losers of Brexit. Yet, as much as 46% of 
the abstainers we surveyed expressed a neutral position on our Emotion scale (online appendix Table A1) 
and about half of them said that the UK government should accept the referendum’s result (online appendix 
Table A2). These figures do not lend much support to the idea of abstainers having been deeply 
disappointed with the outcome. 
6 The figures in this paragraph combine “satisfied” and “very satisfied” answers. 
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slightly higher than that of winners (52%). The 20-point gap for the same variable (57% 
vs. 37%) between “sore” and “graceful” losers is striking and clearly reminds us that the 
crucial distinction after an election is perhaps not between winners and losers, but 
between “sore” and “graceful” losers, with the latter being a group that adds to the 
democratic majority, which provides greater legitimacy to a given political outcome. 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
To better assess these previous findings, it is important to establish if the observed 
differences in Table 3 hold when tested with a multivariate model. The literature on the 
determinants of satisfaction with democracy offers good insights about the specification 
of an adequate model for this variable. Besides the winning/losing experience, previous 
works have shown that satisfaction with democracy is linked to citizens’ socio-
demographic characteristics as well as to their evaluations of politicians’ responsiveness 
and perceptions of the ability of the authorities to deliver favorable outcomes, particularly 
on the economic front (Nadeau and Blais 1993; Anderson and Guillori 1997; Anderson et 
al. 2005; Curini et al. 2011; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Singh et al. 2012; Howell and 
Justwan 2013; Blais et al. 2017). Based on these previous studies, we devise the 
following explanatory model: 
(1)  Satisfaction with democracy = f (age, gender, education, income, external efficacy, 
economic perceptions, winning/losing).7 
Results from this regression model are presented in Table 4. We report OLS results for 
the sake of simplicity but using more complex methods leaves our main findings intact. 
The results in column 1 are in line with current work on the determinants of satisfaction 
with democracy. Political support is higher among better educated respondents and those 
expressing higher levels of external efficacy and economic optimism. Also consistent 
with previous research, the results show that being on the losing camp’s side reduces the 
expressed level of satisfaction with democracy. The most revealing results are displayed 
in column 2. They show that the difference between graceful losers and winners is not 
statistically significant (coefficient = .01, t = .40). The opposite is true for winners and 
sore losers. In this case, the difference in the level of satisfaction with democracy is 
noticeable (-.08) and easily statistically significant (t = 4.1). The magnitude of this impact 
is twice as large as for the traditional winner-loser gap (-.08 vs. -.04; compare columns 1 
and 2). This result underlines the importance of graceful losers for the stability of 
democratic institutions. Contrary to sore losers, graceful losers accept electoral outcomes 
and keep a high level of confidence in the democratic process. It is thus important to 
better understand who the graceful losers are and why do they comply gracefully with the 
democratic will after the voting act. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Based on the general hypotheses we expressed earlier, we expect that, compared to sore 
losers, graceful losers will be less emotionally engaged in the Brexit debate, more 
politically sophisticated, more critical of the EU and more inclined to make their voting 
                                                             
7 All variable codings are provided in the online appendix. 
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decision closer to polling day. The results presented in Table 5, which offers descriptive 
information about the characteristics of winners, graceful losers and sore losers, seem to 
corroborate these expectations. The results in the first row of Table 5 (Happy (Leave)) 
show the intense satisfaction and the profound angriness of winners and sore losers. The 
results also reflect graceful losers’ obvious disappointment after the defeat of the Remain 
option, but they do indicate that the intensity of their emotional reaction was less 
pronounced than for sore losers. The results in the second row of Table 5 (Information) 
show that graceful losers indeed stand out as more politically cognizant than sore losers 
(and slightly more so than winners). The results in the third (Attach UK-EU) and fourth 
(Centralization) rows show that graceful losers express more moderate opinions on these 
questions than sore losers. Finally, the higher score found in the last row (late deciders) 
confirms that graceful losers were more numerous to make their decision later (in the 
final week or on polling day) than winners and sore losers. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The results in Table 5 offer a first look at winners and losers’ profiles. To arrive at firmer 
conclusions, we ran a multinomial regression, the most appropriate method to use with a 
categorical dependant variable (Greene 2003). Extant studies on the reactions of winners 
and losers offer some clues on how to model the decision-making process of graceful 
losers. Socioeconomic variables are commonly found in models of losers’ consent and 
are included here as controls (see, for example, Curini et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2012; 
Howell and Justwan 2013; Rich 2015; Rich and Treece 2018). The multivariate model 
estimated also includes the attitudinal and behavioral variables (Emotion, Information, 
Centralization, Attachment (UK-EU) and Moment of decision) that we just looked at in 
Table 5. Given that our main interest lies in the comparison of the two groups of losers, 
the category “sore losers” forms the omitted category in the estimation. The overall 
explanatory model can be expressed in equation form as follows: 
(2)  Graceful losing = f (age, gender, education, income, emotion, information, 
centralization, attachment, late decision) 
The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 6. The value of the pseudo-
R2 (.74) points to the good overall performance of the model. The results in column 1 are 
based on the contrast between winners and sore losers whereas those in column 2 
compare graceful and sore losers. The results indicate that socioeconomic variables are 
not very useful at discriminating between our three groups of voters.8 Such is not the case 
for the other five variables. Not surprisingly, the strongest contrast is observed in column 
1 which compares winners to sore losers. The distance between both groups is noticeable 
both regarding their positions on the EU as well as in terms of their emotional reaction 
following the victory of the Leave option (see the coefficients for the variables Emotion, 
Attachment and Centralization). 
[Table 6 about here] 
                                                             
8 Table A3 in the online appendix, which adds regional dummy variables to this model, further indicates 
that there is no significant relationship between an individual’s region of residence and the likelihood to 
accept the referendum’s outcome. 
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The previous results have shown the importance of distinguishing between graceful and 
sore losers to better understand the distribution of political support among various groups 
of voters after Brexit. The results in column 2 offer interesting indications as to the 
reasons why graceful losers were more willing than sore losers to accept this outcome. 
The positive sign of the Emotion variable first suggests that graceful losers’ emotional 
reaction to their defeat was less intense than for sore losers. Furthermore, the significant 
result for the Information variable signals that graceful losers’ higher level of 
sophistication may have propelled them to use democratic principles in forming their 
opinion about the legitimacy of the referendum’s outcome and hence be more likely to 
accept their defeat. 
The last three variables show that graceful losers were driven by contradictory feelings 
when faced with the options on the table. These variables may be interpreted as reflecting 
the state of mind of “cross-pressured voters”, who are either ambivalent about the 
different options or simply have a moderate opinion about the issue of the UK’s 
membership in the EU. The positive coefficient for the Attachment and Centralization 
variables signal for instance that graceful losers were less attached to the European Union 
and more prone to think that it decides on too many issues than sore losers. Holding these 
mixed, more moderate views about the British membership to the European Union may 
explain why graceful losers have made up their mind on this question later than sore 
losers have. 
The average marginal effects displayed in the online appendix (Table A4) round out the 
picture. These results neatly suggest that graceful losers expressed more moderate and 
informed views than sore losers. In fact, on all five of our attitudinal variables of interest, 
the average marginal effect is negative and statistically significant for sore losers, with 
effects ranging from -.08 for the late decision variable to -.34 for the emotion variable. 
Average marginal effect values are all positive for winners, whereas for graceful losers 
they are typically in-between the more extreme values found for the other two groups. 
Overall, the moderate profile of the crucial group of graceful losers once more stands out. 
 
Conclusion 
The rallying of a significantly large group of “losers” after an election is crucial to 
ensuring the stability of a democratic system. Therefore, it is essential to explain why 
“graceful losers” overcome their disappointment and help consolidate the democratic 
majority that confers legitimacy upon the winner. We thus need to better understand the 
profile and the motivations of these “graceful losers” and see in which ways they differ 
from “sore losers”, who refuse to recognize their opponent’s victory. 
This paper examined the distinct profiles of “graceful” and “sore” losers by studying 
them in the context of the “Leave” victory in the June 2016 Brexit referendum. In the 
aftermath of this referendum, narrowly won by the “Leave” side with 51.9% of the votes, 
more than one third (37%) of the losers recognized the legitimacy of this result and 
believed that the government had to respect the will of the people and negotiate the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU. What is essential for the continued stability of the democratic 
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process is not the slim majority of the winning side, but the broad coalition of those who 
recognize the legitimacy of the “Leave” camp’s victory. As we noted earlier, while some 
of our survey respondents may have been aware that the Brexit referendum was not 
legally binding, we do not think that there were many of them or that this issue affected 
their view about the legitimacy of the outcome in a way that would significantly 
undermine our interpretation of the results. 
The findings presented in this paper first cast a new look on the traditional winner-loser 
gap examined in the literature. This gap is theorized as representing the expression of 
post-electoral attitudes of winners and losers towards the democratic process. The 
expectation is that winners’ and losers’ views about this process after elections will 
evolve in opposite directions because of the happiness of the former and the 
disappointment of the latter. This perspective clearly suggests that post-electoral 
reactions are mainly outcome-driven. Our findings indicate that these reactions are also 
motivated by individuals’ views on democratic principles and that this mode of reasoning 
is, hopefully from a democratic standpoint, central to the reactions of a significant group 
of losers after a voting decision. The fact that the level of satisfaction with democracy for 
graceful losers is at par with the level observed for winners is revealing and illuminates a 
central mechanism ensuring the stability of democratic regimes. This stability seems to 
depend on the crucial expression of a process-driven reservoir of support for political 
institutions by graceful losers after elections. 
Therefore, this study focused on the motivations of the losers who nonetheless 
recognized the legitimacy of the “Leave” victory. We showed that graceful losers are 
politically involved and principled citizens who are more inclined to judge the merits of 
democracy in procedural terms. They will accept the result of an election unless they 
have strong reasons to believe that the process that has produced this outcome was 
flawed. Losers’ reactions also depend on the specificities of the debate. Consent was 
easier for the “soft” Remain supporters who were more critical of the EU, less 
emotionally engaged in the debate, more optimistic about the consequences of a Leave 
victory, and torn between the two options until the end of the campaign. 
The results ultimately show that the rallying of losers is rooted in a tension between 
frustration and reason. Emotion can drive some losers to refuse to accept defeat whereas 
reason brings an essential minority of losers to muzzle their anger out of respect for the 
rules of the game in a democracy. This tension between emotion and reason, often hinted 
at but seldom studied, refers to the two sides of the democratic dynamic. Conflicts could 
leave a certain number of losers unwilling to lay down their arms in the aftermath of 
defeat. But democracy is also a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of these conflicts, 
a valuable collective asset that a sufficient number of losers support by accepting their 
personal defeat. 
While the context of a referendum, plebiscite or initiative may be particular in the sense 
that it creates definite losers who cannot hope to have a next chance to become winners, 
we have no reason to believe that our core findings about the general profile and 
motivations of graceful losers would be that much different in another voting context. 
That said, an obvious next research step would be to do something similar to what the 
Brexit survey used here has allowed us to do, which is to directly ask losers of national 
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elections whether they think that the government just elected has legitimately won and 
has now the right to adopt the integrality of its election platform. Such a survey question 
would have the potential to deepen our knowledge about the profile and motivations of 
sore and graceful losers and to show more directly whether the distinctions between both 
groups brought to light in this study extend to other contexts. 
This study’s findings regarding the equilibrium between emotion and reason provide the 
image of the ideal citizen: informed, sophisticated, committed, and able to overcome their 
frustrations after a defeat. However, some of our other findings bring more nuances to 
this idyllic portrait. The stability of democracies also seems to depend on another group 
of voters who are rarely celebrated by analysts. Our results show that late deciders and 
voters torn between contradicting considerations are an indispensable component of the 
democratic majority in the aftermath of an electoral campaign. That a group of voters 
such as late deciders, who have a reputation for being uneducated and emotional, 
contribute to the stability of democratic regimes seems counter-intuitive. Also surprising 
is the idea that voters who are split between contradictory considerations and less likely 
to exhibit consistency and stability in their opinions may be more inclined to gracefully 
accept defeat. 
This result may be a lesson in humility and realism for democratic theorists. It is clear 
that the stability of democracies depends on a solid cohort of sophisticated voters among 
the losers, capable of prioritizing the benefits of the democratic process over sometimes 
disappointing outcomes. It is also true that the strongest rallying within the losing camp 
occurs amongst those individuals who, while having firm opinions on a question, accept 
the democratic verdict. But it is no less true that the stability of a democracy also partly 
depends on voters who are indecisive, hesitant, torn, and above all, moderate. This 
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Table 1. Winning and democratic majorities in the 2016 referendum on 
British membership of the European Union 
      
  Government should accept the result? 
 Vote  All Winners Losers 
Leave 52 Yes 65 93 37 
Remain 48 No/DK 35 7 63 
Notes: The vote column represents the official results (rounded) of the 2016 referendum on 
British Membership of the European Union. The legitimacy question reads as follow: “Do you 
think that the government should accept the result of the referendum and that the UK should 
leave the European Union or do you think that the government should not accept the result of 








Table 2. Satisfaction with democracy in the UK and vote about 
the UK leaving: bivariate relationship 
 Losers Winners  
Very satisfied 7 10  
Satisfied 38 42  
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied 16 16  
Dissatisfied 29 22  
Very dissatisfied 10 10  
N 573 684  
Pearson χ2  12.33 (.015)  
Gamma   .13 (.003)  
Notes: Entries are column percentages. Satisfaction with democracy: On a 
scale of 1 to 5, respondents say that how satisfied they are with the way that 
democracy works in the UK (1=Very dissatisfied to 5=Very satisfied). Winners 
correspond to respondents who voted for Leave, Losers to respondents vote for 
Remain and agree that government should accept the result of the referendum 
or to those who voted for the Remain option and agree that government should 






Table 3. Satisfaction with democracy in the UK and reaction to vote about 
the UK leaving: bivariate relationship 
 Sore losers Graceful losers Winners 
Very satisfied 6 7 10 
Satisfied 30 50 42 
Neither dissatisfied, nor satisfied 16 16 16 
Dissatisfied 34 21 22 
Very dissatisfied 13 6 10 
N 341 232 684 
Pearson χ2    39.95 (.000) 
Gamma    .15 (.000) 
Notes: Entries are column percentages. Winners correspond to respondents who voted for Leave, 
Graceful Losers to respondents vote for Remain and agree that government should accept the 
result of the referendum and Sore Losers to those who voted for the Remain option and agree that 







Table 4. Linear regression models for satisfaction with 
democracy in the UK 




























Sore losers -- -.08** 
(.02) 
Graceful losers -- .01 
(.02) 




N 1,195 1,195 
R2 .14 .15 
Notes: Entries are linear regression coefficients with error standard 
deviations in parentheses.  * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests). For 











Table 5. Descriptive statics for winners, graceful losers and sore 
losers 
 Winners Graceful losers Sore losers 
Happy (Leave) .78 (.21) .34 (.26) .18 (.24) 
Information (EU) .56 (.27) .57 (.28) .50 (.28) 
Attach (UK-EU) .83 (.17) .60 (.17) .50 (.17) 
EU too centralized .96 (.14) .74 (.29) .56 (.28) 
Late deciders .30 (.29) .35 (.30) .25 (.26) 
N 684 232 341 
Notes: Entries are means with standard errors in parentheses. See the appendix 






















Table 6. Multinomial regression model of winners, 














































Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 .74 
Notes: Entries are multinomial regression coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses.  The reference category is Sore 
losers. * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 
